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Contested river crossings have been thought of a few of the hardest operations within the army. Merely gaining management of the waterway to allow a protected crossing can usually be a problem. As soon as throughout the river, a small pressure will instantly remoted, surrounded by hostiles on three sides with their backs to the river.
Traditionally, main contested touchdown operations required one among two issues:
Huge superiority of forces (quantitative and/or qualitative)
Air superiority
The previous presumably requires little clarification. The latter generally is a main equalizer by limiting the power of the enemy to deliver reinforcements or provides in opposition to the touchdown web site—serving to the equalize the logistical challenges confronted by the touchdown pressure.
A giant a part of the problem for Ukraine is the truth that it doesn’t have both of the elements of a profitable amphibious touchdown operation.
Regardless of missing overwhelming pressure or air superiority, Ukraine has managed simply that—a profitable river crossing and the establishing of a beachhead (latest protection right here, right here, and right here). How did they do this? And why has Ukraine held on to that beachhead and expanded it regardless of the arrival of Russian T-90M and T-72 tank tanks, mechanized infantry, and Russia’s treasured few remaining airborne (VDV) forces?
It seems that Ukraine is leveraging two benefits it DOES should simulate the results of those two “conventional” elements—its hard-earned artillery benefit, and its drones.
The primary, and arguably most vital consider Ukraine’s present Kherson operation is its hard-earned artillery benefit. Russian sources have warned of a rising Ukrainian benefit within the artillery struggle since early Summer time, and Kherson has been no exception.
Russian army blogger/propagandist Romanov describes how Russian forces in Kherson have been combating Ukrainian artillery and counterbattery fireplace.
That is Kherson oblast. The scenario is dire. [The Ukrainians] are hanging with artillery, hanging with FPV drones, proper now shelling is x4 what it was earlier than. We’re holding however we have to assume properly and strengthen the protection close to the bridge.
For this we’d like correct [electronic warfare], assist of artillery for fast destruction of enemy targets. There’s none of that right here.
[Ukrainians] determine this out and now they’re launching FPV drones at us with out punishment killing our greatest troopers for nothing.
This Ukrainian artillery benefit has been constructed on three benefits:
Superior counterbattery radars: radar models that observe the place artillery and mortars fireplace from based mostly on their shells’ trajectories.
Superior precision munitions: Russians have extremely restricted portions of Krasnodar laser-guided shells. Ukraine has the Excalibur GPS shell, BONUS 155mm antitank guided munitions, GMLRS guided rockets, and extra for counterbattery fireplace.
Superior vary: Russian artillery maxes out at round 25 kilometers. Ukrainian GPS guided shells and rockets can strike so far as 50-70 kilometers. Even unguided shells like Rocket Assisted Projective shells (RAP shells) or base bleed shells just like the M864 DPICM cluster munition shells have a 30+ kilometer vary, far outranging Russian artillery.
Every of those components permit Ukrainian artillery to strike and destroy Russian artillery extra continuously, with far decrease corresponding dangers of destruction. At present, it’s estimated that Russia loses three to 4 weapons for each Ukrainian gun misplaced.
Why does this artillery benefit matter, significantly in Ukraine’s river crossing operations?
As a result of Ukraine can present a lot of its essential firepower from it’s personal aspect of the river, with no need to fret about shifting large portions of provides to the opposing financial institution.
Ukrainian artillery typically operates round 10 kilometers from the entrance strains, so working an analogous distance from the entrance, Ukraine can nonetheless strike deep behind the river.
With the river being about 1 kilometer large in most locations, Ukrainian artillery ought to be capable to lay down barrages so far as 20-25 kilometers from the river utilizing customary shells. If Ukraine continues to function its artillery 10 kilometers behind the entrance strains, its beachhead can advance one other 15 kilometers deeper into Russian strains earlier than it wants to fret about crossing its weapons south of the river, with all of the attendant provides challenges that may create.
Ukraine has dispatched the thirty fifth Marine Brigade Krynky—a few of Ukraine’s best mild infantry troopers.
Outfitted with comparatively few tanks, the Marines are skilled to struggle on foot, quite than driving into battle on closely armored infantry combating autos.
This concentrate on small unit dismounted infantry techniques makes the Marines’s logistical wants extraordinarily mild, particularly when it might probably go away its supporting artillery models on the alternative aspect of the river.
Supplying meals, water, small arms ammunition, and some mortar or anti-tank missile rounds to a marine unit could be far much less demanding than making an attempt to function the fuel-hungry Bradleys or BMP1 infantry combating autos that equip Ukraine’s strongest heavy mechanized infantry brigades—not to mention gasoline devouring monsters just like the Abrams tank (which burns round 2 gallons per mile).
When encountering heavy Russian armor, the Marines should depend on shoulder-fired anti-tank guided munitions just like the Javelin missile, or upon precision anti-tank munitions from the rear, such because the 155 BONUS anti-tank shell fired from a normal 155mm howitzer, which deploys two radar-homing anti-tank munitions in midair that blast into enemy tanks and armor.
The Ukrainian beachhead would battle in opposition to an enormous Russian armored counterattack, however so far none has materialized. This can be resulting from Ukrainian strikes which have severely depleted Russian gear reserves and stockpiles.
Particularly, Ukraine has focused Russian air defenses, provide depots and troop concentrations, and digital warfare models. As such, Russian provide strains are unprotected from Ukrainian drone strikes. Russian models alongside the Dnipro, such because the 205th Brigade, have been repeatedly complained of provide depletion since as early as August 2023.
Quite a few movies of Ukrainian drones intercepting Russian provide vans trying to maneuver gasoline, meals, or ammunition to the entrance strains have proven the effectiveness of Ukrainian drone interdiction.
Russian air protection is so deteriorated that Ukraine has begun launching assault helicopter raids, flying in at low altitude earlier than lobbing a salvo of unguided rockets at a goal after which pulling again.
These elements clarify Russia’s ineffective response to the rising Ukrainian beachhead. A Nov. 6 Russian armored counterattack was rapidly dispatched by Ukrainian drones, with at least three tanks destroyed. Ukraine misplaced no floor.
Subsequent up for Ukraine: increase its beachhead to permit for the institution of a pontoon crossing—almost certainly round Krynky and Korsunka, from which they’ll then push east towards Nova Kakhovka, and Melitopol past, south to Crimea, or west to clear area across the Antonivskyi Bridge for maybe a second river crossing.
A pontoon bridge from L’vove to Korsunka would give Ukrainian provide vans a sequence of small roads via which to drive provides. I wrote a complete story on this potential river crossing level right here. However these are small roads, thus Ukraine would want to liberate a spot like Nova Kakhovka to actually unlock sturdy logistical routes for additional advance.
With this dense community of highways, as many provide vans and troops Ukraine can deliver throughout by pontoon bridges could be introduced ahead.
So a Ukrainian marketing campaign would probably take the steps of
Safe Korsunka or one other pontoon bridge web site.
Preserve the combating inside 10-15km of the riverbank so the artillery on the proper financial institution can present the majority of the firepower.
Leverage the provides from this crossing to increase the bridgehead pressure, and advance to seize a bigger logistical hub (Nova Kakhovka ideally, or Oleshky, which might permit Ukraine to bridge across the destroyed Antonivskyi Bridge).
Use provides from this logistical hub to deliver a mechanized pressure to the left bank–begin advancing on Russian positions deeper in Kherson.
After that? Ukraine can look east towards Zaporizhzhia and Melitopol, or south to Kherson, forcing Russia to make some troublesome choices about how and the place to deploy its forces.
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